Hartmann's *Armer Heinrich*: The Classical Mediaeval Dilemma of *Ere*

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At the end of Hartmann's first narrative, *Erec*, the hero is restored to his rightful place in society, accorded the honour which is his due as a model sovereign, one who is now also aware of the obligations imposed by his position. In words which clearly anticipate the dilemma of a later hero, Heinrich, Hartmann gives us a pointer to one of the paradoxes of mediaeval social status:

> er tete sam die wîsen tuont,
> die des gote genâde sagent
> swaz si êren bejagent
> und ez von im wellent hân.
> sô triuget manegen ein wân
> der in benamen beswîchet,
> sô er sich des muotes rîchet,
> ob im iht guotes widervert,
> daz im daz sî beschert
> niuwan von sîner vrümekeit,
> unds gote dehein genâde seit.[1] (10085-95)

Honour as that which is one's *due*, as a reward for excellence, and honour as that which is one's *duty*, imposing its own expectations; how could it be otherwise in that feudal society, with its precarious balance between privileges and obligations? Whether the bestowal and acceptance of honour form part of the relationship between the individual and society, as they tend to do in the courtly romances, or part of the relationship with God, as is the case in spiritual works, status is a "toilsome burden" (*arbeitsamer last*, *Armer Heinrich* v. 68[2]), at once rewarding and demanding. This reciprocal connotation may be a relic of the Germanic socio-military structure known as the comitatus.[3]

The origin of M. H. G. *êre* (often plural) is uncertain. One scholar suggested the name of an Etruscan deity as the concrete starting-point,[4] and the occasional use of *êra* in some O.H.G. glosses for the male sex organ points to some pagan fertility cult where

awe, respect, veneration are appropriate.[5] Friedrich Maurer tried to demonstrate that religious connotations were not present from the beginning, that there was a development from an earlier concrete, external connotation for O.H.G. *êra* towards the inner, ethical connotation of the Staufer era, and that this extension of meaning took place only at the end of the twelfth century.[6] His findings were challenged by G. Müller, who argued that credit for the first attempt to provide an ethical perspective to *êra* belongs already to Notker.[7] A further, more fundamental divergence of opinion on mediaeval honour, however, had long been developing around the concept of a "ritterliches Tugendsystem": was there an ethical code for the Christian nobility with a triad of values *êre, guot, gotes hulde* derived from Cicero's *honestum, utile, summum bonum*, or was the whole edifice a figment of Ehrismann's imagination?[8] It is not necessary to rehearse the arguments here, but it is worth noting first, that whether one relates M.H.G. *êre* to Latin *honestum* or to Latin *honos* (and the latter seems more appropriate[9]), to concentrate on M.H.G. *êre alone* in any discussion of mediaeval values is likely to be a fruitless enterprise, since the mediaeval mind was sophisticated enough to realise that external recognition (honos) is valid only when based on virtue (honestum),[10] and secondly, that any attempt to extrapolate from literary texts - even political texts such as Walther's famous *Reichston*, which became the starting-point for much of the debate about a "ritterliches Tugendsystem" - to some actual code of ethics which may have existed in real life, may even have been taught in some form, seems to me unjustifiable.

Behind M.H.G. *êre* there may be not *honos* or *honestum*, but Latin 'gloria'. Especially in works such as the *Rolandslied* and *Kaiserchronik*, but also in clerical works of the courtly period, and even on occasions in courtly works themselves, *êre* is a double-edged sword, doing duty for Latin *gloria* in rendering such impeccable spiritual tags as *in gloriam Dei* (*gote z'êren, durch gotes êre*), and being used likewise for the negative *inanis gloria* whenever there is a suggestion of inordinate materialistic or egocentric concern.[11] *Ere*, far more than other values such as *staete, triuwe*, etc., could easily be tinged with negative connotations, the conscious or unconscious pursuit of *êre* seen as an obstacle to salvation. Although it is of course precisely the achievement of the classical courtly culture to have freed honour from such a stigma to some extent, by stressing the acceptability of secular success, it would be wrong to assume the courtly poets were always comfortable with it. The much-quoted lines from Walther's *Reichston* are not unique in pointing to the dilemma of reconciling worldly honour and God's grace.[12]

Indeed, Hartmann's *Armer Heinrich* presents us with what might be regarded as the classical mediaeval conflict between secular and spiritual *êre*: The hero Heinrich would seem to embody the courtly world's conception of honour, the heroine the clerical world's. Heinrich, struck down without warning and convinced of the hopelessness of his plight, bitterly assesses his past in terms which anticipate Walther's triad of *êre, guot* and *gotes hulde*, and locates the dilemma, as Walther is later to do (through the metaphor of the *schrîn*), in his own heart:[13]

daz herze mir dô alsô stuont,
als alle werlttôren tuont,
den daz raetet ir muot,
daz si êre unde guot
âne got mügen hân.
sus trouc ouch mich mîn tumber wân,
wan ich in lützel ane sach,
von des genâden mir geschach
vil êren unde guotes.
dô des hôchmuotes
den hôhen portener verdrôz,
die saelden porte er mir beslôz.
dâ kume ich leider niemer in. (395-407)

A further point to note about Heinrich's self-abasement here is that, for him, the problem has been one of lack of "recognition", both in the literal and in the figurative sense; like the English "look to", "recognize", the mediaeval German *ane sehen* presumably combines both the physical act of beholding and the extended sense of acknowledging. By his own admission, then, Heinrich has demonstrated the impossibility of enjoying the worldly values *êre* and *guot* while neglecting the third and most important factor in the equation. Appropriately, at the end of the work he is restored to health and then to his former wealth and prestige but possesses them in a manner which is enhanced by the inclusion of the vital component; his physical "wholeness" is but an outward manifestation of the wholeness of his attitude:

er wart rîcher vil dan ê
des guotes und der êren.
daz begunde er allez kêren
staeteclîchen hin ze gote

und warte sîme gebote
baz danne er ê taete.
des ist sîn êre staete. (1454-60)

Anton Schönbach interpreted this new-found *êre* as spiritual, pointing to *staete* as equivalent to *eterna*, but the combination with *guot* (and the combination amounts almost to a leitmotiv throughout the work) surely indicates that Heinrich is returned to *secular* honours, is able to enjoy the privileges and respect due to his position in the courtly world, even though he puts these things now, of course, in the proper perspective.[14]

The fact that Heinrich is allowed to return to even greater worldly prestige than before is one of the reasons for rejecting the simplistic view of the work as a dualistic juxtaposition of the courtly and the spiritual conceptions of honour. Another reason is that whatever he himself may say on the matter in his dejected self-analysis in v. 395ff., this is, after all, only Heinrich's own view, which turns out to be deficient in at least one important point, as we shall see later. The narrator does not present Heinrich as one luxuriating in the privileges of his position or over-concerned with the outward trappings of honour. Indeed, in the passage describing Heinrich's talents, the external, material gifts *geburt* and *guot* seem to be contrasted with, and perhaps subordinated to, *êre* and *muot*:

swie ganz sîn habe waere,
sîn geburt unwandelbaere
und wol den fürsten gelîch,
doch was er unnâch also rîch
der geburt und des guotes
so der êren und des muotes. (41-45)

Whereas on most occasions in the work *êre* is coupled with *guot*, and the implication is that both are secular values at odds with *gotes hulde*, here the narrator makes a finer distinction, coupling on the one hand *geburt* and *guot*, presumably as the inherited, material, objective blessings Heinrich possesses, and on the other *êre* and *muot*, apparently as the subjective, internal qualities (*tugent* v. 40) which are superior to the former. Although there is no need to assume that *êre* is any less *secular* than *guot*, the narrator does at least imply that the honour and prestige Heinrich enjoys are not simply externals, but laudable features of Heinrich's personality. A little later, however, the narrator seems to suggest that the hero's *werltlîche êren* belong to the objective externals, which he is able to enhance through other qualities:

ân alle missewende
stuont sîn êre und sîn leben.
im was der rehte wunsch gegeben
zu werltlîchen êren.
die kunde er wol gemêren
mit aller hande reiner tugent. (54-59)

Presumably the adjective *werltlîch*, which together with other combinations with *werlt* give a strongly secular and slightly menacing tone to the description of Heinrich's blessings and fall,[15] relativizes Heinrich's honour here, but the occurrence in such quick succession of two rather different uses of *êre* demonstrates the dilemma of the modern interpreter, and perhaps also that of the mediaeval poet who is part of a courtly, secular culture which values its honour, and simultaneously part of a Christian community which regards worldly honour with some suspicion.[16]

The position of the heroine is likewise not as clear-cut as one might think on first reading. For one thing, she nowhere explicitly rejects secular honour outright, and in fact, in a roundabout way concedes that *êre* may be seen as a thoroughly positive quality like *tugent*. In a passage which the narrator consciously models along similar lines to Heinrich's catalogue of virtues, the girl stresses the irrelevance of all worldly excellence in the face of death:

ez enschirmet geburt noch guot,
schoene, sterke, hôher muot;
ez enfrumet tugent noch êre
für den tôt niht mêre
dan ungeburt und untugent. (727-31)

Although the whole tenor of her words is of course negative, in that she attaches no importance to the world, she at least makes a distinction, as the narrator had done earlier, between material benefits (*geburt, guot*) and qualities of character such as *tugent* and *êre*, qualities of whose value in a restricted sphere there can be no doubt. Indeed, when she does couple *êre* with *guot* and thus suggests worldliness, she uses the combination not of Heinrich's position, but her own family's. When trying to persuade her parents to agree to her sacrifice she reminds them of the *guot und êre* they enjoy and which are threatened by Heinrich's imminent death (vv. 495, 617), a point which the narrator also makes (v. 363). Even if one restricts *êre* here to the relatively modest prestige enjoyed by the family in the rural community,[17] the fact that the girl

regards it, together with worldly wealth, as worth preserving is to some extent a contradiction of her own "otherworldliness". She seems to recognize various spheres of honour, in fact, a thoroughly worldly one for Heinrich which includes health, wealth, and the restoration of his position in courtly society, a modestly worldly one for her parents, based on their relative comfort and prosperity, and of course her own spiritual honour which is to be ensured by death:

muoz ich alsus verlorn hân
die rîchen himelkrône?
diu waere mir ze lône
gegeben umbe dise nôt.
nû alrêst bin ich tôt.
owê, gewaltiger Krist,
waz êren uns benomen ist,
mînem herren unde mir!
nu enbirt er und ich enbir
der êren, der uns was gedâht.
ob diz waere volle brâht,
sô waere im der lîp genesen
und müese ich iemer saelic wesen. (1312-24)

In the last two verses she has defined Heinrich's and her own honour, physical and spiritual salvation respectively.

This personal, spiritual honour to be gained through self-sacrifice is also behind an apparently illogical reference to *êre* by the girl during her plea to her parents. As part of her emotional blackmail she argues:

und ob ir mir gunnet
beide guotes unde êren,
sô lâzet mich kêren
ze unserm herren Jesu Krist,
des gnâde alsô staete ist,
daz sî niemer zergât [. . .](814-19)

Once again we have the triad *guot, êre*, and *got* (here Christ), but the secular values *guot* and *êre* would seem to be not obstacles to God's grace but rather attainable *through* God. The discrepancy is only apparent, however, for the girl's words are part of an ongoing allegory in which the afterlife expected as a reward for her sacrifice is described in thoroughly material terms, as an idyllic estate with an abundance of all

material blessings and Christ as the manager of the estate.[18] Far from being secular, then, the girl's expected *guot* and *êre* are heavenly rewards, translated into an idiom appropriate to her station.

Our survey of the uses of *êre* in the work does not lead to a clear-cut picture. Whereas on occasions *guot* and *êre* are secular externals impinging on God's grace, they may also be distinguished from one another when *guot* is seen as a physical possession and *êre* something more praiseworthy, in the category of *tugent*. On one occasion both *guot* and *êre* are not secular at all, but God's rewards in Heaven, and again, a single instance of *êren* alone may be applied by the girl to refer to her own spiritual salvation and to Heinrich's recovery of prestige. Heinrich is allowed to regain his honour in the world (cf. v. 1528), albeit in the proper perspective, and one assumes that the girl, in marrying Heinrich, abandons her mistrust of worldly values and shares in Heinrich's status.

Although there may be no simple division into secular and spiritual spheres however, an understanding of mediaeval honour can help us appreciate the subtlety of the work, particularly when one sees the *êre*-motif as part of a wider complex. It has often been stressed that a major difference between mediaeval and modern conceptions of honour is that the former is a rather more external, visible quality.[19] As with all courtly values *êre* is a perception from outside, "Ansehen" in its literal sense. For mediaeval man, a loss of honour is what we would perhaps call a loss of "face", to enjoy *êre* is to enjoy the respect, the "regard" of the external world. Courtly society was a goldfish bowl with the individual under scrutiny, virtues and vices had to be obvious to be valid. A modern reader cannot help but be amused, for example, when in Hartmann's *Gregorius* a girl struggling with her lustful brother declines to raise the alarm because it might cost them their *êre* (vv. 390, 401); to submit to incest rather than face public humiliation seems to us to indicate a distorted sense of honour. Similarly, we wonder about priorities in Gottfried's *Tristan*, when the hero has deflowered the intended bride of his uncle and liege lord while she is in his care, but insists on bringing her home somewhat less than intact, after a struggle with his honour (v. 12507ff.); and again later, when in the Minnegrotte the adulterous lovers interrupt their idyllic intimacy to return to court because of their *êre* (v.17698). One might be tempted to explain such examples away as irony in the case of Gottfried, but this is not likely to be so with Hartmann.

Bearing in mind this conception of honour as something largely external, visible, and public, we are in a better position to understand some of the subtleties of

Hartmann's work. *Der Arme Heinrich* is in fact a narrative with a strong emphasis on the visual sense, largely because the hero is one whose position is determined by the public view of him and his view of the outside world. It has already been noted that the word *werlt* and its compounds recur with rather ominous frequency throughout the description of Heinrich's honour and fall, not only suggesting the lack of a spiritual point of reference but also underlining how *public* Heinrich's position is.[20] If his honour seems to be without blemish, we are immediately reminded that this ideal status is *werltlîch* (v. 54-57); he is a "mirror radiating worldly joy" (v. 61), a metaphor which captures superbly both the reciprocal nature of courtly values and the fact that it is very much a question of public perception. Heinrich's qualities earn him public acclaim and praise (der werlte lop unde prîs, v. 73), and his contentment, too, is clearly defined in secular terms (werltlîche wünne, v. 79; werltlîche süeze, v. 87).

If Heinrich's position has been established very largely as public recognition, how cruel must be the shock when the public gaze is turned away. In other words, if Heinrich's honour consists in the respect of others, the outside world's "view" of him, there could scarcely be a more palpable negation of his honour than the sort of affliction which makes him so *visibly* abhorrent:

> dô man die swaeren gotes zuht
> gesach an sînem lîbe,
> manne unde wîbe
> wart er dô widerzaeme.
> nû sehet, wie genaeme
> er ê der werlte waere,
> und wart nû als unmaere,
> daz in niemen gerne ane sach. (120-27)

Heinrich has lost face, he can no longer attract and reflect the world's approval. Having seen the effect of this affliction on the public's perception of Heinrich, we then see Heinrich's response, again in part in images of sight and light:

> ein swinde vinster donerslac
> zebrach im sînen mitten tac;
> ein trüebez wolken unde dic
> bedaht im sîner sunnen blic.
> er sente sich vil sêre

daz er sô manege êre
hinder im muose lâzen. (153-59)

The honour he has lost is the "image" of himself in the public eye. The sudden change in circumstances is likewise described by the narrator largely through parallels with visual phenomena: the candle extinguished when burning brightly, blossom falling when at its freshest (v. 101ff.)[21] The visual impact is reinforced by the narrator's epideictic style, the frequent reminders to his audience to "look" and "behold" the remarkable change in Heinrich's fortunes (vv. 101, 106, 124, 190). Just as the courtly hero Heinrich requires a new view of himself, so the courtly poet seeks to open the eyes of his public for *their* salvation.

When Heinrich confesses his shortcomings to the girl's parents he admits to a faulty perception in his earlier existence, a lack of "recognition" of God as the source of his position in society (vv. 392ff., quoted above). If Heinrich now sees things differently, however, why must his recovery be delayed? Why does God not accept Heinrich's penitent spirit and spare him further suffering? The outward trappings of honour are gone, his gaze is now directed back on his own heart, he speaks convincingly of the delusion he was prone to formerly, and the way would seem to be clear for the recovery we suspect is to come. Yet his new vision is defective on two counts: first, it has led him from the earlier distorted view of the secular to a new distorted view of the spiritual. Whereas he had not previously recognized God as the source of his *worldly* status, he is now equally culpable in not recognizing God as the source of his spiritual salvation. Heinrich has moved from a position of supreme self-confidence to the opposite extreme of abject despair, the dangerous denial of God's capacity for forgiveness which is the theme of Hartmann's *Gregorius*:

dô des hôchmuotes
den hôhen portener verdrôz,
die saelden porte er mir beslôz.
dâ kume ich leider niemer in. (404-07)

Heinrich's new distorted vision threatens to deny him access to *der hôhe portener.* Further, there is evidence that even at this point Heinrich has still not completely corrected his conception of the role of public opinion; he is still all too conscious of the gaze of the world on him when he calls his condition *disen schemelîchen spot* (v. 383) and laments his degradation in the eyes of his fellow man:

nu versmâhe ich den boesen,
die biderben ruochent mîn niht.

swie boese er ist, der mich gesiht,
des boeser muoz ich dannoch sîn.
sîn unwert tuot er mir schîn;
er wirfet diu ougen abe mir. (412-17)

Although apparently regretful of his earlier limited view of his status, then, Heinrich is not yet completely free of it. Even later, his initial decision not to accept the girl's offer of sacrifice is made for the wrong reason, this inordinate concern for his honour in the eyes of others:

diz waere der lantliute spot,
swaz ich mich für dise stunde
arzenîen underwunde
und mich daz niht vervienge,
wan als ez doch ergienge. (956-60)

If Heinrich's view of the world and of his position in it is suspect, it is appropriate that the scene which signals his change of attitude is carefully structured to highlight different manifestations of "seeing". The whole episode in Salerno is in fact a subtle piece of stage-managing which brings together various threads from the Christian-exegetical tradition and from Hartmann's own courtly background. We may note first the distinction between physical sight and spiritual sight, between the *oculi carnei* (eyes of the flesh) of Job 10,4, and the *oculi cordis* (eyes of the heart) of Ephes. 1, 18, and the concept of Christ as *lux vera* (Joh. 1, 9), the light which enables the eyes of the heart to see the truth.[22] The physician in Salerno takes great pains to hide the girl's imminent death from Heinrich's view:

hin fuorte er sî ze stunt
in sîn heimlîch gemach,
da ez ir herre niht ensach,
und beslôz im vor die tür
und warf einen rigel für.
er enwolte in niht sehen lân,
wie ir ende solte ergân. (1194-1200)

The immediate reason for the physician's elaborate care is not clear; it is possible that he wishes to spare Heinrich the gruesome details, but if we recall that Heinrich

had earlier hidden himself away from the sight of his fellow man, because his condition is an affront to his honour, we may assume that here, too, there is an element of shame attached to the deed. Concealment implies that what is concealed will not bear contemplation in the light of day.

The first stage in Heinrich's rehabilitation is his determination to see the deed for what it is, that is, to see beyond his own status in society. Again the narrator describes in detail how Heinrich, moved by the thought that he will never see the girl again, forces himself to face up to his action:

> und erbarmete in vil sêre,
> daz er sî niemer mêre
> lebende solte gesehen.
> nu begunde er suochen unde spehen,
> unze daz er durch die want
> ein loch gânde vant,
> und ersach sî durch die schrunden
> nacket und gebunden. (1239-46)

The elaborate concealment of the proceedings by the physician now becomes part of the test of Heinrich's resolution, since he must make an effort to break down the barrier of shame. There follows the famous change in Heinrich's perspective, from visual perception to what we might call ethical insight, and what a mediaeval scholar might have called *oculi cordis*:

> ir lîp der was vil minneclich.
> nû sach er sî an unde sich
> und gewan einen niuwen muot.
> in dûhte dô daz niht guot,
> des er ê gedâht hâte,
> und verkêrte vil drâte
> sîn altez gemüete
> in eine niuwe güete. (1247-54)

Paradoxically, it is a thoroughly physical, worldly sight, the girl's naked beauty, which induces the change in Heinrich's spiritual attitude; but what Heinrich contemplates goes beyond the physical surface, the girl's wholesome body compared with his own loathsome one, to the fundamental truth of his relationship with God. In coming to his decision Heinrich stands apart from his own carnality and looks at it

from outside, so to speak, so that he can look within himself with the "eyes of the heart".[23] Conversely, the new spiritual attitude is expressed in terms of physical vision:

ich enwil des kindes tôt niht sehen (1270)

ditz kint ist alsô wünneclich,
zwâre jâ enmac ich
sînen tôt niht gesehen. (1287-89)

Heinrich does not become a monk in spiritual contemplation, or a visionary; he retains his worldly vision, but sees beyond the surface to the spiritual truth within.

It often appears to be assumed, at least tacitly, that Heinrich's recovery follows immediately on his change of heart, that God intervenes as soon as Heinrich shows evidence of his new "insight" by putting a stop to the operation. In fact, the process is again not so straightforward, for the miracle is wrought only during the journey homeward, after the girl has given vent to her frustration in an apparently childish tirade against Heinrich's fickleness. This scene is something of an embarrassment to those who see in the girl the font of all spiritual wisdom, sent to correct Heinrich's self-indulgence. In fact, as should by now be clear, the girl's arguments on spiritual matters have no effect on his attitude whatsoever; on the contrary, it is her physical, worldly presence, the fact that she embodies all that is visually satisfying in life, which triggers Heinrich's change of heart. Of course, it is possible to interpret this outburst as part of her own trial in God's eyes: just as Heinrich is finally persuaded to accept God's will, so must she accept that her destiny is not what she had imagined, and this tantrum of hers is a measure of how diffucult it is for her to abandon her personal interpretation of honour:

nu enbirt er und ich enbir
der êren, der uns was gedâht. (1320-21)

In this connection it is worth remembering that the narrator does in fact refer to a test of *both* Heinrich and the girl (v.1384ff.). But her outburst also represents a further test of *Heinrich's* new sense of honour, and this, it seems to me, is its primary purpose and the reason why the hero's recovery does not take place already in the physician's rooms. For what the girl throws in Heinrich's face is nothing less than his former reputation in the world:

sî sprach: "ich muoz engelten
mînes herren zageheit.

mir hânt die liute misseseit,
daz hân ich selbe wol ersehen.
ich hôrte ie die liute jehen,
ir waeret biderbe unde guot
und hetet vesten mannes muot;
sô helfe mir got, sî hânt gelogen.
diu werlt was ie an iu betrogen.
ir wâret alle iuwer tage
und sît ouch noch ein werltzage." (1330-40)

That ominous word *werlt* recurs here, evoking once again Heinrich's former status in society (cf. *diu liute*), but now in the sense of his reputation for honourable dealings in the eyes of his fellow man. In recalling the *êren* which Heinrich is in danger of losing (v. 1320f.) the girl taunts him with the vision of passive, worldly prestige again, but also with the other side to courtly honour, the fact that it must be actively pursued; in denying the girl her sacrifice, Heinrich is apparently belying his reputation for honesty, going back on his word of honour, a fact which the girl throws in his face, calling him not only a coward but also fickle:

ob irz durch iuwer triuwe lât,
daz ist ein vil swacher rât,
des iu got niht lônen wil,
wan der triuwen ist ze vil. (1353-56)

When Heinrich refuses to bow to this pressure, then, and sets off homeward expecting to find *mit gemeinem munde niuwan laster unde spot* (v. 1374f.), it is not only the scorn at his continued affliction that he must face, nor even the mockery of another failure in the eyes of his peers, which had also concerned him (v. 956), but the added degradation that his word of honour is suspect, his reputation as one whose word was his bond. In placing God's will above this last blow to his former honour especially, Heinrich demonstrates clearly his new view of values: how God sees him is more important than how society sees him.

There follows the well-known intervention of God or Christ who restores the hero to health so that society can then restore him to his former position of honour. The miracle is obviously a high-point in the work in terms of its effect on the poet's public: like all Christian miracles it is intended to make manifest that which might otherwise be beyond the grasp of sinful, mortal man, in this case, God's appreciation of

loyalty and charity (v. 1390), But it is also an artistic high-point, the culmination and resolution of several loose threads, if I may be allowed a mixed metaphor. There is, for instance, the second of two comparisons with Job (v. 1388), on this occasion, of course, a neutral rather than an uncomplimentary comparison, with Heinrich, the girl, and Job cited as objects of divine testing. Less obvious, perhaps, is the connection with Heinrich's earlier "confession", in which the hero's imagined exclusion from Paradise had been described as a rejection from *die sælden porte* by *der hôhe portener* (v. 405f.). The narrator picks up the metaphor of the Gatekeeper again, and at the same time "corrects" the metaphor in the same way that the second comparison with Job had "corrected" the first:[24] God/Christ is no longer one who denies Heinrich access, but rather one who *has* access to every heart (*vor dem deheines herzen tor vürnames niht beslozzen ist*, v. 1382f.). In other words the despair latent in Heinrich's earlier words is here countered by the message of Christian faith.[25]

The term *cordis speculator* for Christ is also an important link in the chain of events. In his well-known study of Hartmann's sources Schönbach commented that he could find no exact scriptural authority for the term, nor did he know of a similar use by any biblical commentators.[26] Yet whether it is a variant of the *cordis scrutator* (*overseer of the heart*) found in the apocryphal Wisdom of Solomon (1,6), or of the expression *inspector cordium* which is documented for clerical writers, or whether, as Schönbach suggests, Hartmann heard the term used in a sermon, the meaning is fairly clear: God/Christ is the one who sees into the heart, no matter how firmly the gate or entrance may be secured. The metaphor is, of course, very relevant. We recall that Heinrich had earlier admitted that he had not "looked to" God as the source of his blessings, and that his change in attitude, in fact, had involved a new "view" of his values after he had looked at the girl and then at and into himself, as it were. In effect, then, Heinrich had followed the example of Christ, had himself acted as *cordis speculator* in respect of his own values, and thus gained a new perspective. Hence it is entirely appropriate that Christ, as *cordis speculator* par excellence, should intervene to acknowledge Heinrich's insight and reward him for it.[27]

Yet there is another dimension to the metaphor involved here, it seems to me. As we have already noted, both Walther's *Reichston* and Heinrich's earlier confession locate the dilemma of reconciling God and worldly honour in the human heart:

daz herze mir dô alsô stuont,
als alle werlttôren tuont,
den daz raetet ir muot,

daz si êre unde guot
âne got mügen hân. (395-99)

This is a variation on a well-known metaphor in mediaeval literature, both secular and clerical: the heart as the dwelling-place roomy enough for love or God, but not for their opposites.[28] Whereas in his "confession" Heinrich laments that his heart has tried to encompass *êre* and *guot* without God, in the dénouement in Salerno there is a subtle shift of emphasis; God, as *cordis speculator* looks into Heinrich's heart, so to speak, and finds there *triuwe* and *bärmde* (loyalty and charity, v. 1390). By linking this scene with Heinrich's confession through the repetition of the comparison with Job and through the Gatekeeper metaphor, the poet invites us to see the new Heinrich not only as a man of faith rather than of despair, but also as one whose heart is the abode of *triuwe* and *bärmde* rather than *êre* and *guot*.

There is, finally, a related metaphor which may also be relevant. Friedrich Ohly has demonstrated how mediaeval thinkers and poets embroidered on the idea of the heart as dwelling-place by the inclusion of various concrete phenomena, a process for which he cites the designation "Naturalisierung der Metapher" employed by Hugo Friedrich.[29] The bible already provides the starting-point for one such extension of the metaphor in the idea of the heart as a door which is firmly secured and at which the lover (in the Song of Solomon, 5, 2) or Christ (as in Revelations 3, 20) knocks and waits for admission.[30] In view of Hartmann's careful description of the scene in Salerno, with Heinrich being securely excluded from the centre of action (v. 1197ff.), being forced to use his eyes to look into the room, at the girl, and into his own heart, and then knocking on the door to demand admission, it is not beyond the realms of possibility that the whole process has a metaphorical significance. Just as the hero must imitate and anticipate Christ in looking into the heart, so he imitates and anticipates Christ in knocking at the door of the heart. The physician's operating room is, on another level, Heinrich's own heart, into which Heinrich himself must look like *cordis speculator*, to distinguish *triuwe* and *bärmde* from *êre und guot*, and at which the hero - again in *imitatio Christi* - must knock to gain entry, thereby ensuring that the true Gatekeeper will ultimately allow him access to Paradise.

If these observations seem to have led somewhat away from the theme of honour this is precisely what Hartmann intends. Having shown us at the beginning a hero who seems to be a paragon of virtue in the eyes of his fellow man, possessing the qualities and prestige which are reserved for only exceptional individuals, the poet then proceeds to call into question the very foundation on which, as far as his typical

mediaeval audience is concerned, that honour is based: the visual image. For Heinrich, "unsightly" leprosy is the negation of honour. There is no need to look for Heinrich's "guilt" or "fault"; as in all Hartmann's works, the first crisis - while it may point to some immaturity on the part of the hero - is more important for its *effect* on him.[31] For Heinrich it brings some measure of "insight":

1) the typical (Walther!) realisation that *êre* and *guot* cannot be selfsufficient,
2) the admission that he had not previously directed his gaze towards God,
3) the implication that his own heart is the source of the problem.

Yet Heinrich also indulges in self-pity bordering on despair, and implies through the metaphor of the doorkeeper that because he is visually and socially an outcast, he must also be one in God's eyes, an attitude which is not only theologically false but is also indicative of Heinrich's continued inability to distinguish God's concept of honour from society's.

Thus, a second crisis is necessary, the scene in the physician's rooms in Salerno which duplicates and corrects several aspects of the first. Heinrich is forced to "use his eyes", to look at the truth, to "see" things in their proper perspective, with the physical vision of the girl paradoxically bringing a moral recognition. God, as *cordis speculator*, looks into Heinrich's heart and finds now not *êre* and *guot* but *triuwe* and *bärmde*. God, as the Gatekeeper, is shown to have access to the heart of even the most despised of men, provided that heart is not filled only with *guot* and *êre*. A further elaboration of the metaphor is possibly implied in Heinrich's knocking at the physician's door and demanding entry, as Christ does at the sinner's heart. The restoration of Heinrich's health and honour, then, is not assured simply through a passive "new vision" of his relationship with the world, but is actively engineered through the hero's imitation of Christ.

Footnotes

1 Ed. Leitzmann/Wolff, Tübingen 1963, (ATB 39); cf *Iwein*, v. 3969ff.

2 *Der arme Heinrich* is quoted throughout according to the edition of Helmut de Boor, Frankfurt 1980.

3 Friedrich Maurer, "Tugend und Ehre" reprinted in the volume *Ritterliches Tugendsystem,* ed. Günter Eifler, Darmstadt 1970, (Wege der Forschung Band LVI), p. 243. Many of the relevant essays are found in this volume, which will be quoted henceforth as WdF.

4 Gustav Must, "The Origin of the German Word *Ehre* 'Honor'", *PMLA* 76 (1961), pp. 326-329.

5 See Elisabeth Karg-Gasterstädt, "Ehre und Ruhm im Althochdeutschen", WdF, p. 255.

6 Friedrich Maurer, *Leid: Studien zur Bedeutungs- und Problemgeschichte*, Bern 1951 and "Tugend und Ehre", WdF, pp. 238-252.

7 Gertraud Müller, "Zu Friedrich Maurer, *Leid,* S. 255, Anm. 179a und S. 280f.", *Beitr.* 74 (1952), pp. 309-316.

8 The volume *Ritterliches Tugendsystem* (WdF) documents some of the major arguments from Ehrismann and Curtius up to 1964.

9 See Friedrich Maurer, WdF, p. 251, and Eduard Neumann "Zum 'ritterlichen Tugendsystem'", WdF, p. 298.

10 Cf. Bert Nagel, *'Der arme Heinrich' Hartmanns von Aue; Eine Interpretation,* Tübingen 1952, p. 38, and Günter Eifler, "Einleitung", WdF, p. XIX.

11 See Horst Richter, *Kommentar zum Rolandslied des Pfaffen Konrad.* Teil I, Bern, Frankfurt 1972, p. 126f.; on the other hand, Elisabeth Karg-Gasterstädt (WdF, p. 274) argues that in O.H.G. the negative connotations were rendered by *hruom.*

12 See Friedrich Maurer, "Das ritterliche Tugendsystem", WdF, p. 158.

13 On the relevance of Cicero's three values *utile, honestum* and *summum bonum* to Hartmann, see Hans Naumann, "Hartmann von Aue und Cicero?", WdF, pp. 190-193.

14 Anton Emanuel Schönbach, *Über Hartmann von Aue* , repr. Hildesheim, N. Y. 1971, p. 138f.

15 Cf. Rodney Fisher, *Studies in the Demonic in Selected M. H. G. Epics,* Göppingen 1974, p. 187f., and Theodor Verweyen, *Der 'Arme Heinrich' Hartmanns von Aue,* Munich 1970, p. 12ff., who rightly declines to see any implication of Heinrich's *guilt* in the word, and speaks rather of *Spannung.*

16 The two examples cited above are a good illustration of a point made by Eduard Neumann (WdF, p. 298): Das Wort *êre* steht auf der *Grenze* zwischen dem *honestum* und dem *utile*, in beide Wertgebiete übergreifend, ohne je einem eindeutig oder ausschließlich zuzugehören. Dem mittelalterlichen Menschen bilden äußere und innere Ehre vielfach eine solche Einheit, daß ihm eine Trennung der beiden in Gedanke, Wort und Leben unmöglich wird.

17 Cf. Schönbach, op. cit. p. 310. On the family's status see Schönbach, p. 308f.

18 Although this and other metaphors used by the girl are well-documented in biblical and patristic literature, I would not go so far as to accept all her arguments as "vernichtende Logik [. . .] ihr vom Hl. Geist eingegeben" (Harold Bernard Willson, "Symbol and Reality in *Der Arme Heinrich*", repr. in *Hartmann von Aue*, ed. Hugo Kuhn and Christoph Cormeau, (Wege der Forschung, Band CCCLIX), Darmstadt 1973, p. 163). The important point is surely that she must be able to convince everyone with her arguments, so that the test may proceed, not that her arguments are necessarily valid for Heinrich.

19 Maurer (WdF, p. 243) quotes a remark by Bismarck which illustrates the point: "Ich kann die Achtung aller Menschen entbehren, nur meine eigene nicht. Meine Ehre steht in niemandes Hand als in meiner eigenen, und man kann mich damit nicht überhäufen; die eigene, die ich in meinem Herzen trage, genügt mir vollständig, und niemand ist Richter darüber und kann entscheiden, ob ich sie habe."

20 Cf. note 15 above, and K. Dieter Goebel, "Boethii *Philosophiae Consolatio* und Hartmanns *Armer Heinrich*", *ZfdPh.* 95 (1976), p. 46.

21 Scriptural and biblical parallels for these metaphors in Schönbach, op. cit. p. 139. A recently found fragment of *Der arme Heinrich* adds yet another such visual image: see Volker Mertens, "Noch einmal: das Heu im *Armen Heinrich* (E 73/B 143)", *ZfdA.* 104 (1975), pp. 293-306.

22 For examples of these ideas in the *Rolandslied* and other mediaeval works see Richter (note 11), pp. 21-31, who quotes Rabanus Maurus on the reason for describing Christ as *lux*: quia ad veritatem contemplandam cordis oculos reserat.

23 This is underlined in the passage describing Heinrich's reasoning (1257-1269); it is in the form of a dialogue with *himself*. On this and the visual element in Heinrich's new resolution see also Verweyen (note 15) p. 75ff.

24 A recent article by John Asher lists examples of repetition and duplication in the work, but apparently overlooks the doorkeeper motif: "Motivverdoppelung im *Armen Heinrich*", *Festschrift für Siegfried Grosse*, ed. Werner Besch et al, (Göppinger Arbeiten zur Germanistik Nr 423), Göppingen 1984, pp. 313-323. It is possible that the technique of duplication may owe something to the courtly romance, especially Hartmann's own *Erec*.

25 It seems that the precarious balance between the extremes of faith and despair which had characterised Hartmann's *Gregorius* is also part of Heinrich's dilemma.

26 Schönbach, op. cit. p. 76.

27 Interestingly, Hartmann uses the expression *des herzen spehaere* for the *eyes* in his *Büchlein*, v. 553 (ed. Schirokauer/Tax, Berlin 1973)

28 See Friedrich Ohly's article "Cor amantis non angustum", repr. in his *Schriften zur mittelalterlichen Bedeutungsforschung*, Darmstadt 1977, pp. 128-155. The

reference to Walther is on p. 134f.

29 *Epochen der italienischen Lyrik*, cited by Ohly, op. cit. p. 130, note 2.

30 For mediaeval versions of this metaphor, see Ohly, op. cit. p. 148ff.

31 Cf. the comments of Kurt Ruh in his essay "Zur Interpretation von Hartmanns *Iwein*" (reprinted in *Hartmann von Aue*, [note 18], pp. 408-425): Zur Strafe tritt überall die Prüfung. Prüfung auf einen Endpunkt hin. Das Mittelalter, zumal auf seiner Höhe, hat immer mehr final als kausal gedacht (p. 417).